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Economic consequences of Key Performance Indicators’ disclosure quality 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Starting from 2006, UK listed companies are required to analyse their performance by using Key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs) in specific sections of their annual reports and the UK Accounting 
Standard Board (ASB) provides companies with guidelines for the best practice regarding KPI 
disclosure. Motivated by the possible effects of the KPI disclosure quality, we examine their 
potential economic consequences for a sample of UK listed firms for the period 2006 to 2010. Our 
sample consists of 448 firm-year observations. We first develop a measure for the quality of the 
KPI disclosure based on the ASB’s guidelines. We then test the economic consequences of financial 
and nonfinancial KPIs disclosure quality both separately and combined into one variable. Our 
findings, after conducting various sensitivity tests, suggest that only the disclosure quality of 
financial KPIs matters. We find a significantly negative (weakly positive) relationship between 
disclosure quality of financial KPIs and the implied cost of capital (firm value). These results 
inform regulatory bodies as well as the academic literature about the potential economic 
consequences of this type of disclosure. 
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1. Introduction 
The UK Companies Act (CA) of 2006 defines key performance indicators (KPIs) as the ‘factors by 
reference to which the development, performance or position of the business of the company can be 
measured effectively’ (UK Companies Act (CA), 2006: 196). The reporting of KPIs should be 
valuable for investors because they contain information related to important aspects of companies’ 
activities which might not be clearly reflected in the financial statements (ACIFR, 2008). Therefore, 
KPIs disclosure is crucial in supporting companies’ communication with stakeholders in order to 
enable a better understanding of financial statements and the companies’ progress towards the 
achievement of their objectives and targets (Accounting Standard Board (ASB), 2006).  
Many regulatory bodies suggest or require companies to disclose KPIs within their annual 
reports (e.g., EU Accounts Modernisation Directive, 2003; IASB, 2010; and SEC, 2003).1 In the 
UK in particular, section 417 of the CA (2006) introduced the requirement for companies (except 
the small ones) to analyse their performance by using KPIs in their Business Review.2 These could 
be financial or, ‘if appropriate’, nonfinancial. The latter could include environmental and employee 
matters (CA, 2006). Furthermore, in January 2006, the ASB issued the reporting statement 
‘Operating and Financial Review’ (OFR) which contains guidelines for the best practices regarding 
KPI disclosure. However, the nature of these requirements allows companies’ directors to exercise 
discretion on the reporting of KPIs: a) they can determine the extent necessary for financial and 
nonfinancial KPIs for an understanding of the development, performance, or position of the 
company; b) they can determine what is appropriate when reporting nonfinancial KPIs; and c) they 
can take advantage of the exemption provisions (10, 11 section 417 of CA, 2006) for not providing 
KPIs information because of confidentiality reasons. Therefore, the quality and quantity of KPI 
reporting should vary among UK companies. However, many reports (e.g., FRC, 2007; 2009) and 
                                                          
1 Throughout the study, EU stands for European Union, SEC stands for Securities and Exchange Commission, and 
IASB stands for International Accounting Standards Board. 
2 In 2013, this requirement was repealed by SI 2013/1970 and superseded by Strategic Report requirements. Thus, the 
substance of the requirement remains. 
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regulatory bodies (IASB, 2010; SEC, 2003) highlight that quality is the crucial issue in KPIs 
reporting and raise concerns about the usefulness of quantity of information regarding KPIs. 
Despite these concerns, we identify only a research monograph which investigates the quantity 
or the quality of KPI reporting for a small sample of UK listed companies.3 Further, we know of no 
study which examines the economic consequences of these disclosures in the UK.4 Considering this 
gap in the literature, we first develop a research instrument to measure the quality of the KPIs 
disclosure. This instrument considers the qualitative attributes of KPIs information as suggested by 
the OFR (ASB, 2006) which are expected to be fulfilled by companies’ corresponding disclosure. 
Subsequently, we manually collect our data from the annual reports of a randomly selected sample 
of UK nonfinancial firms which were constituents of the FTSE 350 for the five-year period of 2006 
to 2010 that results in 448 observations. Once we calculate KPIs disclosure scores, we conduct 
univariate and multivariate analyses to explore their relationship with companies’ implied cost of 
capital (ICC) and their value relevance.  
We find high variations in KPIs reporting practice across the sample firms with a clear 
tendency to focus on financial KPIs. Although the quality of KPIs disclosure increases over time, 
the mean quality scores are relatively low (below 50% for both financial and nonfinancial KPIs). 
These low scores indicate that although the companies do disclose some information about financial 
and nonfinancial KPIs, they fail to follow the ASB’s (2006) guidelines for best practice. Our 
empirical results show that the quality of financial KPI disclosures is negatively related with 
companies’ ICCs and has a weakly positive relationship with their market values. Additional tests 
also show that the quantity of KPIs reporting results in no economic consequences, which confirms 
the regulatory bodies’ recommendations that the quality of KPI reporting is of great importance. 
                                                          
3 Tauringana and Mangena (2009) investigate the reporting of KPIs by 32 UK media sector companies listed on the 
London Stock Exchange over the period 2004 to 2007.  
4 In fact, to the best of our knowledge, the only study focusing on KPIs reporting being relevant to this one, to some 
extent, is the study by Dorestani and Rezaee (2011). The authors examine the association between non-financial KPIs 
disclosures and the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts for a sample of US firms for the two-year period 2006 and 2007.  
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Based on these findings, our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we 
develop a context-specific measure of the quality of KPIs reporting. As highlighted by Leuz and 
Wysocki (2008), there is a lack of a measure which combines all of the desirable properties for 
disclosure. The approach we follow could be beneficial for future studies dealing with disclosures 
in order to avoid proxy-selection biases. Second, we add empirical evidence about the economic 
consequences of the quality of the KPIs disclosure. We find that the more companies disclose 
financial KPIs that follow the ASB’s (2006) guidelines, the more they benefit from a reduction in 
their cost of capital and an increase in their market value. These results suggest that KPIs related 
information in companies’ annual reports is fed into the companies’ cost of capital and market 
valuation, indicating that the requirement for companies to disclose KPIs contains value relevant 
information for financial statements users. This should be of interest to companies as well as 
regulators. Additionally, our findings of very low quality levels for KPIs disclosure indicate that 
many UK firms do not follow the ASB’s corresponding guidelines and this should have an appeal 
to regulators. Arguably, more consultation with preparers and users on how the principles to be 
followed could add value by improving the quality of the information disclosed. Finally, this study 
has policy implications beyond the EU and the UK in particular. It is also relevant in the US since 
the SEC has introduced the requirement for companies to publish KPIs since 2003 and research 
regarding the economic consequences of such reporting is absent.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 draws on the relevant regulatory 
framework and has a review of the relevant literature. In this section, we also develop the 
hypotheses tested. Section 3 discusses the research design. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis, 
and Section 5 discusses the results from the sensitivity tests. Section 6 concludes.  
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2. Regulatory Framework and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Regulatory framework 
To highlight the increasing trend of requiring KPIs reporting across the world and in the UK in 
particular, this section reports the main relevant requirements for KPIs reporting that came into 
force the last decade or so. At an international level, first, in 2003, the SEC released a guideline 
which emphasises that ‘companies should identify and discuss key performance indicators, 
including nonfinancial performance indicators, that their management uses to manage the business 
and that would be material to investors’ (SEC, 2003). Also in 2003, the EU adopted the Accounts 
Modernisation Directive (2003) according to which the companies in Member States are required to 
include in their annual reports ‘both financial and, where appropriate, nonfinancial key performance 
indicators relevant to the particular business, including information relating to environmental and 
employee matters’ (EU Accounts Modernisation Directive, 2003). And, in 2010, the IASB issued a 
practice statement entitled Management Commentary according to which companies preparing their 
financial statements under the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are required to 
disclose in the Management Commentary the ‘performance measures and indicators (both financial 
and nonfinancial) that are used by management to assess progress against its stated objectives.’ 
(IASB, 2010: 15).  
In the UK, while implementing the aforementioned EU Directive, the CA (2006) (Section 417) 
required all companies, except those defined as ‘small’, to analyse their performance using KPIs in 
the Business Review.5 The act states that KPIs could be financial or, if appropriate, nonfinancial, 
that cover, for example, environmental and employee matters. However, the nature of the regulation 
enables companies’ directors to control KPI reporting at least in the following ways: a) by 
determining the ‘extent necessary’ (CA, 2006: 196) for financial KPI reporting; b) by judging when 
the nonfinancial KPI reporting is ‘appropriate’ (ibid: 196) ; and c) by avoiding KPI reporting ‘if the 
disclosure would, in the opinion of the directors, be seriously prejudicial to the interests of the 
                                                          
5 In 2013, this requirement was repealed by SI 2013/1970 and superseded by Strategic Report requirements. Thus, the 
substance of the requirement remains. 
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company’ (ibid: 197). Additionally, the CA (2006) does not have a sample set of KPIs to be 
reported by all companies nor a specific guideline on how to present KPIs.6 Therefore, KPIs related 
disclosure is considered quasi voluntary instead of mandatory.  
This discretion led the ASB to issue the reporting statement ‘OFR’ in 2006. This contains 
guidelines to achieve the best practices regarding the KPIs disclosure, although it does not provide a 
specific list of KPIs to be reported. It concentrates on KPIs reporting practice and lists qualitative 
key characteristics to be fulfilled when companies report KPIs. Moreover, with a focus only on 
nonfinancial KPIs, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) issued 
guidelines on how UK companies should measure and report on their environmental impacts 
(DEFRA, 2006; 2012).  
Surprisingly, there is absence of academic research which explores the potential economic 
consequences and valuation implications of KPIs disclosure. Focusing on the UK, the Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC) has repeatedly monitored KPI reporting practices and has highlighted 
many critical points mainly in terms of the quality of KPIs reporting. First, a report issued by the 
FRC in 2007 reflects on the KPIs reporting practice by UK listed companies in 2006. The report 
concludes that ‘many companies are providing a good deal of information on measures and 
indicators, but improvements can be made in identifying their KPIs, both financial and 
nonfinancial’ (FRC, 2007: 3). A similar report was issued by the FRC in 2009. This reviewed the 
narrative reporting by UK listed companies in 2008 and 2009 and points out that some companies 
were not disclosing KPIs. Thus, the report suggests that the CA’s (2006) wording ‘to the extent 
necessary’ and ‘where appropriate’ provided excuses for avoiding the KPIs disclosure, even though 
the KPIs can always enhance the narrative (FRC, 2009). Conversely, other companies were 
reporting too many KPIs: in some cases ‘there were too many KPIs to all be key – for example, one 
company listed 68 measures throughout the report and there were several others with close to 20’ 
(FRC, 2009: 27). Therefore, similar to the earlier report, the FRC (2009) has focused on best 
                                                          
6 The same applies to SEC (2003), EU Accounts Modernisation Directive (2003), and IASB (2010). 
 8 
practices for KPIs reporting in terms of quality and has stated that quality can be achieved when 
‘each KPI disclosure includes definition, purpose, comparatives, commentary on targets, etc.’ 
(FRC, 2009: 26). This report does not contain a list of KPIs to be disclosed, but preparers are 
advised to report only those KPIs which are clearly relevant to the business. The findings of both 
reports and the guidelines from the ASB (2006) and DEFRA (2006; 2012) indicate that what 
matters in KPIs reporting is quality and not quantity. The same conclusion appears to be the focus 
for the SEC (2003) and the IASB (2010) guidelines given that they both suggest that the KPIs 
reported should be accompanied by information which enhances their understanding and why they 
are relevant. 
The focus on KPIs reporting quality is understandable, if one considers that information 
conveyed through this type of disclosure is not standardised (as it would be if mandated by 
accounting standards for example). Thus, a clear indication of the KPIs’ qualitative characteristics 
(e.g., definition, calculation method, purpose for disclosing, and motivation of why the disclosure 
should be useful to users of the annual report) is essential for the understanding of the nature of a 
firm’s business and value creation model. These characteristics are included in those highlighted by 
the ASB (2006). Considering the definition of KPIs in the CA (2006) and the important 
expectations about the usefulness and relevance of this type of disclosure, we develop a measure 
which captures the KPIs disclosure quality and investigate their economic consequences. We 
examine the relationship of KPIs reporting quality with the cost of capital and market value of UK 
firms.  
 
2.2 Hypotheses Development 
Given that KPIs reporting intends to provide investors with a better understanding of the data 
contained in financial statements and is available to the insiders (CA, 2006; FRC, 2007; 2009; 
IASB, 2010; SEC, 2003), KPIs disclosure should mitigate problems from information asymmetry. 
Financial and nonfinancial KPIs should reduce the uncertainty with regard to business performance, 
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therefore helping investors to make a better valuation of a company. In such contexts, the disclosure 
literature argues that corporate disclosure is able to reduce the information asymmetry between 
insiders and outsiders (e.g., Kothari et al., 2009). Thus, enhanced disclosure might lead to an 
increase in the demand for a company’s share and in turn the share’s price (Clarkson et al., 1996; 
Hassan et al., 2009) because the disclosure should correct any firm misevaluation (Healy et al., 
1999). A rich information environment could lead to desirable economic consequences such as a 
reduction in the firm’s cost of equity capital (Beyer et al., 2010; Leuz and Wysocki, 2008) and an 
increase in the firm’s value (Leuz and Wysocki, 2008).  
The disclosure literature offers two theoretical frameworks to support the proposition that 
greater corporate disclosure is associated with a lower cost of capital. The first suggests that 
disclosure reduces adverse selection and, as a result, increases liquidity. As discussed above, greater 
disclosure reduces the possibility of information asymmetries. This, in turn, enhances stock 
liquidity and reduces the cost of capital by reducing the discount at which shares are sold through 
reduced transaction costs or by increasing the demand for a firm’s securities (e.g., Diamond and 
Verrecchia, 1991; Easley and O’Hara, 2004). The second framework suggests that increased 
disclosure reduces the estimation risk in two ways: first, securities with more information are less 
risky because of lower uncertainty surrounding the exact parameters of their return distribution 
(e.g., Clarkson et al., 1996; Easley and O’Hara, 2004); and, second, the covariance of a firm’s cash 
flow with the cash flow of other firms decreases as disclosures increase (e.g., Hughes et al., 2007; 
Lambert et al., 2007). Thus, enhanced corporate disclosure directly reduces estimation risk that 
leads to an indirect reduction in the firm’s cost of capital. 
The latter framework is also useful in examining the link between corporate disclosure and firm 
value. In addition to the direct effects on the covariance of a firm’s cash flow, corporate disclosures 
have the potential to change the firm value by affecting managers’ decisions and hence altering the 
distribution of future cash flows (Lambert et al., 2007). Thus, there might be indirect effects on the 
firm value through cash flow expectations formed on the basis of enhanced corporate disclosure.  
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Based on these findings, improved corporate disclosure should reduce the cost of capital and 
increase the market value at the same time. However, the firm value might change even if the cost 
of capital does not. This change in value happens when cash flow expectations do not change 
proportionally to covariance estimates (Pope and McLeay, 2011). Thus, in exploring the economic 
consequences of KPIs reporting, we focus both the cost of capital and the firm value. 
The empirical evidence for the effect of disclosure on companies’ cost of capital and their 
market value is mixed (Beyer et al., 2010; Kothari et al., 2009; Healy and Palepu, 2001). For 
example, some studies report a negative association between disclosure levels and firms’ cost of 
equity capital (e.g., Botosan 1997; Richardson and Welker, 2001; Hail, 2002). However, Botosan 
and Plumlee (2002) find a negative (positive) association between annual report disclosures 
(quarterly report disclosures) and the cost of capital.  
Similarly, the empirical literature examining the link between corporate disclosure and firm 
value also offers mixed results. For example, a number of studies report a positive association 
between these two variables (e.g. Baek et al., 2004; Cheung et al., 2010; Jiao, 2011). However, 
Hassan et al. (2009) find that there is no significant association between firm value and voluntary 
disclosure, while there is a negative and significant relation with mandatory disclosure when the 
relation of their relationship with market value is tested simultaneously. Finally, Uyar and Kiliç 
(2012) find that the association between voluntary disclosure and firm value varies depending on 
the proxy used for firm value.  
Beattie et al. (2004) suggest that the mixed evidence on the economic consequences of 
enhanced disclosure might be due to an insufficient degree of accuracy in measuring the primary 
variable of interest (i.e., disclosure). Along these lines, Leuz and Wysocki (2008) argue that the 
theoretical research provides little guidance on what form of disclosure is relevant for various 
stakeholders. They also underline that many desirable properties of corporate disclosures have been 
identified so far: for example quantity, quality, timeliness, relevance, reliability, and comparability. 
However, some of these are in conflict with others. Thus, Beyer et al. (2010) argue that there is a 
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lack of a definition of voluntary disclosure and financial reporting quality and recommend that 
future research addresses this issue. In spite of this call, researchers are still facing the challenge of 
identifying and capturing the most important dimensions of high quality corporate information 
(Leuz and Wysocki, 2008).  
The KPIs reporting in the UK offers a unique setting to contribute to the disclosure literature. 
However, one caveat is that the KPIs disclosure can be considered as quasi voluntary because a 
high degree of discretion is left to managers despite its requirement by CA (2006). Thus, we test the 
following non-directional hypotheses:7  
 
H1: KPIs disclosure quality is significantly associated with the cost of equity capital. 
H2: KPIs disclosure quality is value relevant. 
 
Additionally, because the CA (2006) requires directors to disclose financial KPIs and, if 
appropriate, nonfinancial KPIs and the different nature of these two sets of information, we also test 
the following ancillary hypotheses: 
 
H1.a: Financial KPIs disclosure quality is significantly associated with the cost of equity capital. 
H1.b: Nonfinancial KPIs disclosure quality is significantly associated with the cost of equity 
capital. 
H2.a: Financial KPIs disclosure quality is value relevant. 
H2.b: Nonfinancial KPIs disclosure quality is value relevant. 
 
3. Research design 
3.1 Measurement of KPIs disclosure quality 
To derive our measure of KPIs disclosure quality, we draw on the OFR (2006) guidelines. These 
describe the key qualitative characteristics of each KPI (see Appendix A for a full list of the 
                                                          
7 Reflecting on Leuz and Wisocki’s (2008: 24) proposition that ‘theoretical research provides little guidance on what 
form, quantity and frequency of disclosure is relevant for various stakeholders’, we also test the economic consequences 
of KPIs disclosure quantity as a sensitivity test (see Section 5). 
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characteristics). We consider that if KPIs disclosure meet these characteristics, then the reporting 
should be of high quality. The following example is indicative of the usefulness of our measure. 
Drawing on the annual report published by Qinetic Group PLC in 2007, we find seven financial and 
two nonfinancial KPIs: proportion of revenue generated in North America; book to bill ratio; 
backlog; underlying earnings per share growth; total shareholder return; operating cash conversion; 
underlying operating profit margin; health and safety of employees; and staff attrition rate. While 
the meaning and usefulness of some of the above KPIs is easily understandable because of their link 
to information related to the financial statements, a broad discussion is needed in order to achieve a 
full comprehension of the information that some of these KPIs convey, including why they are 
considered relevant to the shareholders (e.g., book to bill ratio; backlog, staff attrition rate). In line 
with the FRC (2009), disclosing the information suggested by the guidelines should indicate the 
quality of the KPI reporting. Thus, our measure considers the content of the KPI disclosure that 
should enhance the understanding of the discussion and analysis. 
Based on this, a dichotomous scoring approach is applied by manually capturing each KPI’s 
disclosure quality. If a required quality dimension is met, it is scored as one, otherwise it is scored 
as zero. If a quality dimension is not applicable to a specific KPI, then it is scored as ‘not 
applicable’ (NA) (e.g. Cooke, 1992).8 Following this procedure, the quality score for each KPI is 
calculated as a ratio of the total quality dimensions at the maximum quality score achievable for that 
specific KPI (time subscripts omitted):  
𝑄𝑙𝐴𝑣𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑠𝑘,𝑗 = 𝑇𝑘,𝑗 = ∑ 𝑑𝑖,𝑘,𝑗𝑖𝑛,𝑘,𝑗𝑖=𝑖1,𝑘,𝑗
𝑀𝑘,𝑗 = ∑ 𝑑𝑖,𝑘,𝑗𝑖𝑚,𝑘,𝑗𝑖=𝑖1,𝑘,𝑗  (Eq. 1) 
where 𝑇𝑘,𝑗 is the total number of quality dimensions (𝑑𝑖, 0 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛) observed for KPI k by firm 𝑗 , 
and 𝑀𝑘,𝑗 is the maximum number of applicable quality dimensions (𝑑𝑖, 0 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚, 𝑚 ≥ 𝑛) for KPI 
                                                          
8 For example, one of the desirable characteristics of KPIs reported is to show adjustments to any financial statement 
information used. However, this characteristic might not be applicable to some nonfinancial KPIs. 
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k by firm j.9  
Once each KPI’s disclosure quality is measured, we estimate each firm-year observation’s 
overall KPI disclosure quality. This is derived as the mean of the KPI quality scores. Thus, KPIs 
disclosure quality for each firm is weighted by the number (i.e., quantity) of KPIs reported. This 
weight is presented as follows (time subscripts omitted): 
𝑄𝑙𝐴𝑣𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑠𝑗 = ∑ 𝑄𝑙𝐴𝑣𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑠𝑘,𝑗𝑘𝑛,𝑗𝑘=𝑘1,𝑗 𝑘𝑛,𝑗  (Eq. 2) 
where 𝑄𝑙𝐴𝑣𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑠𝑗 is the KPI quality score for firm j, lying between zero and one; 𝑄𝑙𝐴𝑣𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑠𝑘,𝑗 is 
each KPI quality score measured according to Eq. (1); and 𝑘𝑛,𝑗 is the number of KPIs disclosed by 
firm j. When no KPI is disclosed, 𝑄𝑙𝐴𝑣𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑠𝑗 is equal to zero. This value means that firm j conveys 
no relevant information with regard to any of the qualitative characteristics in the OFR.  
We apply this method to derive six scores of KPIs disclosure quality: the overall quality scores 
disclosed in the annual report (OvKPIsRep) or just in the Business Review (OvKPIsSec); the scores 
related to the financial KPIs only disclosed in the annual report (FKPIsRep) or just in the Business 
Review (FKPIsSec); the scores related to the nonfinancial KPIs only disclosed in the annual report 
(NonFKPIsRep) or just in the Business Review (NonFKPIsSec). Appendix B provides an example 
of how we compute overall quantity and quality of KPIs reporting as well as for financial and non-
financial KPIs separately.10 
We do not use the actual QlAvKPIs scores in the multivariate analysis. We employ the 
following transformations instead. First, we calculate the percentile rank (QlAvKPIs_rank) (e.g., 
Glaum et al., 2013; Nikolaev and Van Lent, 2005) by using the dense rankings in the following 
                                                          
9 Quality dimensions are unweighted in order to avoid subjectivity in selecting a set of weights, given the lack of a 
commonly accepted procedure in the disclosure literature. 
10 Before scoring all of our sample firms, we conduct a pilot study on a randomly selected sample of ten annual reports 
to address the validity and reliability of our instrument (cf., Tsalavoutas et al., 2010). We first develop decision rules, 
and these are used as a reference while coding. Furthermore, each researcher independently codes the annual reports of 
the pilot study sample to ensure consistency in applying these rules. Additionally, we perform nonparametric tests 
(Kruskal-Wallis) to compare the quality scores we coded separately. These indicate that there is no significant 
difference between the median scores among us, verifying the reliability of our research instrument (results are 
available upon request). While following this process we noticed that companies do not disclose KPIs only in the 
Business Review as suggested by the CA (2006), but also in other areas of the annual report.  
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equation: 
𝑄𝑙𝐴𝑣𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑠_𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑗,𝑡 − 1𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡 − 1 (Eq. 3) 
where 𝑄𝑙𝐴𝑣𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑠_𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑗,𝑡 is the percentile rank of firm j during year t, 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑗,𝑡 is the rank/position 
of firm j during year t , and 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡 is the sample size less the number of ties for year t. The 
KPIs disclosure quality is ranked in ascending order, so that the newly created variable increases 
with the KPIs disclosure quality (see, e.g., Glaum et al., 2013; Hail, 2002) and this variable lies 
between zero and one.11 Thus, according to our hypotheses, the higher (lower) the KPIs disclosure 
quality, then the lower (higher) the cost of capital and the higher (lower) the KPIs disclosure 
quality’s value relevance. Second, we also consider the normal scores (QlAvKPIs_norm) as an 
alternative transformation (Cooke, 1998). We calculate QlAvKPIs_norm by using the following 
equation: 
𝑄𝑙𝐴𝑣𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑠𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜑−1 � 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑗,𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡 + 1� (Eq. 4) 
where 𝑄𝑙𝐴𝑣𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑠_𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑗,𝑡 is the normal score of firm j during year t, and 𝜑−1(∙) is the inverse of 
the cumulative density normal function.  
 
3.2 Cost of equity measurement 
Early studies on estimating cost of equity capital relied on ex-post realised returns to measure the 
ex-ante expected returns. However, subsequent studies demonstrate that realised returns are a noisy 
proxy for expected returns (e.g., Fama and French, 2002). Among all of the possibilities, we focus 
on the implied cost of equity capital (hereafter, ICC) that does not rely on biased realised returns or 
on asset pricing models (Hou et al., 2012) because its reasoning is based on a variation of the 
Edwards-Bell-Ohlson accounting model (Edwards and Bell, 1961; Ohlson, 1995).  
During the last decade, many ICC models have been developed and compared in the literature. 
                                                          
11 For example, for 2009, we identify the following levels of quality of Financial KPIs reporting for companies A, B and 
C in our sample: 0.15, 0.40, and 0.625. Their corresponding percentile rakings are 0.015, 0.367, and 0.953. 
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Botosan and Plumlee (2005) compare five measure of the ICC and demonstrate that the one 
proposed in Botosan and Plumlee (2002) (hereafter, 𝑟𝐷𝐼𝑉) and in Easton (2004) (hereafter, 𝑟𝑃𝐸𝐺) are 
the most reliable. This conclusion is inferred from the fact that 𝑟𝐷𝐼𝑉 and 𝑟𝑃𝐸𝐺 are consistently and 
predictably related to corporate characteristics such as market risk, leverage risk, information risk, 
residual risk, and growth. Easton and Monahan (2005) compare seven ICC measures (including 
𝑟𝑃𝐸𝐺 but not 𝑟𝐷𝐼𝑉) and conclude that all are unreliable proxies. However, they argue that the 
measure developed by Claus and Thomas (2001) (hereafter, 𝑟𝐶𝑇) is a reliable proxy for firms with 
low consensus long-term growth forecasts. In recent years, Botosan et al. (2011) test the validity 
and reliability of eleven proxies for the ICC. In line with Botosan and Plumlee (2005), they again 
conclude that 𝑟𝐷𝐼𝑉 and 𝑟𝑃𝐸𝐺 are the most valid and reliable proxies. Considering the findings of 
these studies, it can be concluded that the ICC literature has not yet identified a commonly agreed 
method for estimating the ICC. 
Moreover, as highlighted in Mazzi et al. (2014), the above said comparisons are based on US 
data and they sometimes rely on US databases (e.g. Value Line). The EU analyses commonly use 
data available in I/B/E/S (e.g., Kim et al., 2012; Li, 2010) and are therefore not able to estimate 
some ICC measures compared in the previous cited studies (e.g., 𝑟𝐷𝐼𝑉). As a result, in order to avoid 
or mitigate some biases highlighted in the literature, many empirical studies have used an average 
of various ICC models (e.g., Daske et al., 2008; Hail and Leuz, 2006). Similarly, we use the average 
of four different measures of the ICC (hereafter 𝑟𝐴𝑉), which are the models used by Claus and 
Thomas (2001) (hereafter 𝑟𝐶𝑇), Gebhardt et al. (2001) (hereafter 𝑟𝐺𝐿𝑆), Gode and Mohanran (2003) 
(hereafter 𝑟𝐺𝑀), and Easton (2004) (hereafter 𝑟𝑀𝑃𝐸𝐺). An indirect advantage of using 𝑟𝐴𝑉 is that it 
allows us to discard as few as possible observations from our sample due to data unavailability.12  
 
 
                                                          
12 We have used the same models’ properties and the details used in their estimation as in Mazzi et al., (2014). Refer to 
the informative appendices B & C in Mazzi et al., (2014) for a description of these details. 
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3.3 Multivariate analyses 
To test our first set of hypotheses (H1, H1.a and H1.b), we proceed as follows. We consider that the 
ICC is a function of KPIs disclosure quality and other control factors suggested by prior empirical 
literature. The latter include risk, growth, and size (e.g., Daske et al., 2008; Li, 2010). Thus, we 
estimate the following regression model: 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑄𝑙𝐴𝑣𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2�𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (Eq. 5) 
where 𝑟 is the implied cost of capital based on the mean of the four estimated ICC measures 
described above. The controls are the M2B (market value (WC08001) to book value of equity 
(WC03501)), SalG (percentage change in sales (WC01001)), AWCA (absolute value of abnormal 
working capital accruals scaled by total assets, according to Marra et al., 2011),13 rVar (return 
variance over the financial year, 𝑙𝑛 (𝑅𝐼𝑡−11/𝑅𝐼𝑡0)); Dispersion (EPS forecasts standard deviation, 
STDEV in I/B/E/S), and AnFollow (the number of analysts following the firm, NUMEST in 
I/B/E/S).  
To test our second set of hypotheses (i.e., H2, H2.a and H2.b), we use Ohlson’s (1995) model 
as a framework which combines accounting and non-accounting data. This method allows us to 
treat the KPIs disclosure quality as ‘other information’ available to the market participants. 
Consistent with this approach, we estimate the following regression model:  
𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑄𝑙𝐴𝑣𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (Eq. 6) 
where MV is the market value of equity (WC08001), BV is the book value of equity (WC03501), 
and NI is the net income (WC01751). All of these variables are scaled by the number of shares 
outstanding (NOSH) (Tsalavoutas et al., 2012; Barth et al., 2008).  
In order to test our ancillary hypotheses, we run the same tests for the overall KPIs quality 
(OvKPIsRep) for financial and nonfinancial KPIs quality separately (FKPIsRep and NonFKPIsRep) 
                                                          
13 𝐴𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑡 = 𝑊𝐶𝑡−�𝑊𝐶𝑡−1𝑆𝑡−1 ×𝑆𝑡�𝑇𝐴𝑡 , where 𝑊𝐶 is non-cash working capital accruals computed as [(𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 (𝑊𝐶02201) − 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ&𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠(𝑊𝐶02001)) − (𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 (𝑊𝐶03101) −
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡(𝑊𝐶03051). 𝑆 and TA stand for sales and total assets (WC01001 and WC02999 respectively). 
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and based on whether these are reported in the whole annual report or in the Business Review 
(OvKPIsSec, FKPIsSec, and NonFKPIsSec). To ensure the robustness of our tests, regressions (5) 
and (6) are estimated using both the KPIs’ quality transformations (i.e., percentile dense rankings 
(QlAvKPIs_rank) and normal scores (QlAvKPIs_norm)).  
Additionally, in estimating the regression models, we control for the cross-sectional 
correlations by using cluster-two by firm and year (see Gow et al., 2010; Petersen, 2009). Further, 
multicollinearity is checked with a variance inflation factor (VIF).  
Finally, in order to address any concerns of endogeneity between KPIs disclosure quality and 
ICC, we also estimate 2SLS regressions. In the 2SLS specification, KPIs disclosure quality is 
treated as endogenous and the following variables are used as instruments  in the first stage: 
Liquidity (current assets (WC02201) to current liabilities (WC03101)), Leverage (debt (WC03051) 
to book value of equity (WC03501)), BoardSize (total number of directors on the board; hand 
collected), RoleDuality (dummy variable equal to 1 if the chairman is the same person as the CEO 
of the firm, 0 otherwise; hand collected), ACmeetings (total number of audit committee meetings 
during the year; hand collected), CrossListing (dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm’s shares are 
traded in foreign financial markets, 0 otherwise), and Industry fixed effects. Second stage is equal to 
equation (5). We then perform the Hausman test which is the most commonly used test providing a 
formal test on whether the instrumental variables estimator is significantly different from the OLS 
estimator (Larcker and Rusticus, 2010).  If the X2 in the Hausman test is significant, the 2SLS 
estimators are better than OLS and vice versa. 
 
3.4 Sample selection process and data 
We examine a panel data set of UK firms over the five-year period from 2006 to 2010. We start 
with the 2011 Financial Times ranking to identify the top 350 UK firms based on market value.14 
                                                          
14 The vast majority of the annual reports for 2010 were issued during 2011. We consider the 2011 Financial Times 
ranking so as to allow information contained in the annual reports for 2010 to be priced by the market, capturing the 
relative size of our sample firms.  
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Following the literature (e.g., Abraham and Cox, 2007; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004), we then 
exclude financial firms, given their specific characteristics and the different framework for 
disclosure practices applicable to them. Subsequently, we randomly select firms so that each 
industry is represented by the same proportion as in the initial sample. In order to do this selection, 
we rank all of the firms in each industry by their market capitalisation, and we use systematic 
sampling by retaining the first firm in every industry as a starting point, then the third, the fifth, and 
so on. Following this procedure, we identify 102 firms (510 firm-year observations over the five-
year period of 2006 to 2010). In a subsequent sampling step, we exclude various observations given 
data unavailability and other constraints. Panel A in Table 1 provides more details on the process 
applied in selecting our final sample (448 observations). In addition, Panel B provides a 
disaggregation of our sample across industries.  
TABLE 1 – ABOUT HERE 
We download annual reports from the companies’ webpages or the Thomson One Banker database. 
We also download firms’ fundamental characteristics from Datastream, analysts’ forecasts from 
Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S), and inflation rates forecasts from the Bank of 
England.  
 
4. Findings 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
We report the descriptive statistics for each control variable in Table 2.15 Data are presented before 
any procedure that accounts for the presence of outliers – see below. The mean (median) MV of the 
sample is £7.5 (1.2) bn, while the standard deviation is £17.3 bn. This high variation is expected 
given that our sample firms are drawn from the FTSE 350 which includes the largest and most 
liquid shares in the UK. The mean (median) market to book value (M2B) is 4.5 (2.7) which suggests 
that financial markets believe that a considerable part of a firm’s value is not represented by its 
                                                          
15 The NOSH and Sal are not used as control variables. The former is used for scaling the variables in Eq. 6 and the 
latter for the calculation of the independent variables. We provide information about these for the interest of the reader.  
 19 
book value of equity. The mean (median) number of analysts following (AnFollow) is 14 (13), with 
a standard deviation of 7. Because we focus on disclosure, the ICC and the firm value, having a 
relative large number of analysts following each firm is desirable for two reasons: first, it confers 
robustness to our ICC measures because we have more forecasts to rely on when estimating the 
ICC; and second, it enhances the potential effect of the disclosure on the ICC and the firm value 
because there are more sophisticated investors who probably pay attention to that disclosure.  
We note that these descriptive statistics show large differences between the mean and median 
values for variables. Untabulated results show that the distribution of NI is negatively skewed, while 
the distribution of all other variables is positively skewed. Thus, we proceed by winsorising the 
independent variables which are not log-transformed at the 2nd and 98th percentiles to account for 
influential/outlying observations. After this procedure, untabulated results show that the distribution 
of our variables is less skewed. For example, the highest skewness before applying the winsorising 
procedure is exposed by M2B and Dispersion (11.735 and 11.087 respectively). After winsorising 
our data, these variables expose significantly lower skewness (3.428 and 2.427 respectively). 
Hence, we use the winsorised data in our empirical analyses. 
TABLE 2 – ABOUT HERE 
Table 3 shows the levels of KPI disclosure quality with regard to what is disclosed in the whole 
annual report. These levels show that the mean (median) quality of the total KPIs disclosed in 
companies’ annual reports increases significantly (p<0.01 based on the Cuzick (1985) test) across 
the sample period (from 29% (31%) in 2006 to 44% (44%) in 2010). This increase results in a mean 
(median) quality of the total KPIs at 38% (41%). The aforementioned trend is mainly driven by an 
increase in the KPIs disclosure quality from 2006 to 2008; in fact, a T-test and a Mann-Whitney test 
show no significant difference between the scores for 2008 to 2009 and 2009 to 2010.   
Similar results occur when exploring the quality levels of the disclosures of the financial and 
nonfinancial KPIs separately. When comparing the two sets of KPIs, we notice that the quality of 
nonfinancial KPIs disclosure tends to be lower than that of the financial KPIs. With regard to the 
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period covered, the mean (median) for the former is 33% (36%) and the corresponding for the latter 
is 36% (38%). The T-test (Wilcoxon test) confirms that there is a statistically significant difference 
at the 1% level (10% level) between the disclosure qualities of financial and nonfinancial KPIs.  
In Panel C of Table 3, we disaggregate our sample firms across quality score groups. The 
information in this panel shows that only a few companies report overall KPIs disclosure with 
qualities higher than 60%, and no company is identified with a KPI disclosure quality above 90%. 
This result is mainly driven by the high quality of the financial KPIs reporting. Furthermore, we 
observe that there is at least one company in each year whose KPIs quality score is zero which 
means that it did not disclose any KPI or it disclosed some, but without reporting any of the 
qualitative characteristics suggested by ASB (2006). 
TABLE 3 – ABOUT HERE 
Given that our KPIs quality measure relies also on quantity, our untabulated results indicate 
that the mean (median) number of total KPIs disclosed in companies’ annual reports increases 
significantly across the sample period (p<0.01 based on the Cuzick (1985) test), moving from 6 (5) 
in 2006 to 10 (10) in 2010.16 The same trend exists with regard to financial and nonfinancial KPIs 
separately. Similar to the results in Table 3, the positive trend in KPIs disclosure quantity is driven 
by an increase experienced from 2006 to 2008. In all of the years, there is at least one company 
which discloses no KPIs, thus being in explicit violation of the CA (2006). At the same time, there 
are always firms which seem to over report KPIs as the maximum number of KPIs reported ranges 
from 24 in 2009 to 87 in 2007. These findings are in line with the FRC (2009) report which inter 
alia points out that some companies report too many KPIs for all be key. 
Table 4 shows the quality levels of the KPI disclosures with regard to what is disclosed in the 
Business Review only. As reported in Table 3, Table 4 shows that the mean (median) quality of 
total KPIs disclosed in the Business Review increases significantly (p<0.01 based on the Cuzick 
(1985) test) across the sample period (from 28% (29%) in 2006 to 43% (44%) in 2010). As with the 
                                                          
16 Tables reporting the relevant information discussed here are available on request. 
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results in Table 3, this trend is driven by an increase in the KPIs disclosure quality from 2006 to 
2008. The mean (median) quality of the total KPIs disclosed throughout the sample period is 37% 
(39%). As these figures are lower than the corresponding ones with regard to the information 
disclosed throughout the whole annual report, they indicate that it is the quality of information 
disclosed in the Business Review that drives the quality of information disclosed in the annual 
report downwards.  
Confirming the previous results from Table 3, we notice that the quality of the nonfinancial 
KPIs disclosure is lower than that of financial KPIs. The mean (median) for the former is 28% 
(29%) and the corresponding for the latter is 37% (39%). The T-test (Wilcoxon test) confirms that 
there is a statistically significant difference at the 1% level (1% level) between our two sets of KPIs. 
TABLE 4 – ABOUT HERE 
Untabulated results on KPIs disclosure quantity show an increase in the number of KPIs 
disclosed within the Business Review as time goes by (p<0.01 based on the Cuzick (1985) test), 
moving from 6 (5) in 2006 to 9 (8) in 2010.17 The same trend is noticed with regard to financial and 
nonfinancial KPIs, and again the number of financial KPIs disclosed is always higher than that of 
the nonfinancial KPIs. The aforementioned trends are again driven by an increase in disclosure 
practices between 2006 and 2008. Additionally, it appears that the mean (median) number of 
nonfinancial KPIs disclosed in the Business Review (2 (1)) is lower than the corresponding number 
in the annual report (3 (2)) which means that this type of information is preferably conveyed in a 
different part of the annual report.  
Table 5 reports more detailed information on the KPIs disclosed and on their disclosure 
quality. Panel A shows that eight out of the ten most commonly reported KPIs are financial, while 
only two are nonfinancial (i.e., employees accidents, ranked 6th, and lost time incidents, ranked 9th). 
The most commonly reported KPIs are related to earnings per share; in 58% of our sample firms, a 
relevant KPI is reported. KPIs related to cash flows and revenues are also frequently reported across 
                                                          
17 Tables reporting the relevant information discussed here are available upon request. 
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our sample firms (57% and 53% respectively). The ten most common financial KPIs disclosed 
relate to information that could be obtained from the income statement (e.g., revenues and margins) 
and from the cash flow statement (e.g., dividends and capital expenditure). Our sample companies 
report these KPIs in their annual reports very frequently, varying from a maximum frequency of 
58% to a minimum frequency of 13%. The ten most common nonfinancial KPIs relate mostly to 
employees and environmental issues. However, we observe that this type of KPIs are more tailored 
to the nature of business of each individual firm, resulting in a much lower repetition of identical 
KPIs across many firms. More specifically, the frequencies of the ten most common nonfinancial 
KPIs vary from a maximum of 20% to a minimum of 2%.  
Panel B reports descriptive statistics on the qualitative characteristics suggested by the OFR 
(2006). We identified that our sample companies disclosed 3,842 different KPIs (2,422 financial; 
1,420 nonfinancial) throughout the whole period. The most commonly fulfilled characteristics are 
definition of the KPIs (98%) and the comparison with the corresponding amount for the financial 
year immediately preceding the current one (90%). One of the lowest disclosed qualitative 
characteristics is the source of the underlying data used for the calculation of a KPI (37%).  
Overall, these descriptive statistics indicate that companies are not forthcoming in relation to 
certain types of KPI, especially those that relate to future related information. This is in line with 
the general narrative reporting literature in which there is consensus that companies are more 
forthcoming about past information than they are about future related information and that 
qualitative information dominates quantitative information. Litigation, proprietary cost issues, 
reputation and self-serving bias may be reasons for such disclosure behaviour. At the same time, 
these descriptive statistics indicate a wide variation on the information disclosed across companies. 
Such a variation may feed into companies’ level of cost of equity capital and valuation. 
TABLE 5 – ABOUT HERE 
Table 6 illustrates the ICC descriptive statistics for the full sample and for each year examined. 
The mean (median) 𝑟𝐴𝑉 varies from a minimum of 8.7% (7.9%) in 2006 to a maximum of 12.6% 
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(10.9%) in 2008. Panel B presents a Cuzick (1985) test which shows no statistically significant 
trend in the ICC through the period examined. This lack of a trend can be explained by the 
information presented in Panel B. The ICC reaches its peak in 2008 and then drops significantly in 
2009 (p<0.01 based on a Mann-Whitney test; p<0.05 based on a T-test) while there is no statistical 
difference between the ICC in 2009 and 2010. Given that we use an average measure, Panel C gives 
the Pearson’s correlation coefficients across the different models that we use in our ICC measure. 
All of the models are positively and significantly (p<0.01) correlated. This correlation suggests that 
all four ICC measures capture similar information and that our average ICC is robust. 
TABLE 6 – ABOUT HERE 
4.2 Bivariate analysis 
The Pearson’s correlation coefficients between all of the variables are presented in Table 7. This 
shows that all of the proxies we use to capture the quality of the KPI disclosures correlate very 
positively and significantly (p<0.01). Regarding our first hypothesis (H1), the preliminary evidence 
is a negative and statistically significant (p<0.01) correlation between the ICC and the overall KPI 
disclosure quality. When looking at the disclosure quality of financial (H1.a) and nonfinancial KPIs 
(H1.b) separately, only the former correlates negatively and significantly with the ICC (p<0.01). As 
far as our second set hypotheses is concerned (H2, H2.a and H2.b), all of the measures of the KPI 
disclosure quality are positively and significantly (p<0.01) correlated with the market value (MV), 
net income (NI), and analyst following (AnFollow).  
TABLE 7 – ABOUT HERE 
4.3 Multivariate analysis 
Table 8 reports the results regarding our first set of hypotheses. Starting with the results presented 
in the two columns entitled ‘Overall’ (H1), the aggregate measure for the quality of KPI disclosure 
is not significantly correlated with the ICC. This result holds irrespective of whether the overall 
KPIs disclosure quality has been captured in the Business Review or the annual report as a whole. 
Instead, the return variance and analysts following play a significant role in explaining the ICC. 
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However, this result can also be explained by the findings reported under the columns entitled 
‘Financial & Nonfinancial’ (with reference to H1.a and H1.b). These columns report the 
disaggregated effect of financial and nonfinancial KPIs disclosure quality on the ICC. These tests 
indicate that only financial KPIs disclosure quality has a negative and significant coefficient which 
means that the enhanced quality of this type of information contributes to a reduction of the ICC. 
The results hold irrespective of the transformation applied for the quality score and whether these 
are related to the KPIs disclosed in the annual report as a whole (-0.029, p<0.05, for dense 
rankings; -0.007, p<0.05, for normal scores) or in the Business Review only (-0.027, p<0.05, for 
dense rankings; -0.006, p<0.10, for normal scores). Drawing on the coefficient of FKPIsRep_rank 
(FKPIsSec_rank) and considering that the values of this variable lie between zero and one (see 
Equation 3 above), the results indicate the following. The firm with the highest quality of Financial 
KPIs reporting in our sample benefits by a 0.29% (0.27%) reduction in its cost of equity capital 
(i.e., 29 (27) basis points) compared to the firm with the lowest quality of Financial KPIs reporting 
in our sample. The return variance and analysts following continue to play a significant role in 
explaining the ICC. Finally, the results of the Hausman test reveals no endogeneity of disclosure 
quality (p>0.10), thus confirming that results under OLS are correctly estimated (see last raw in 
Table 8).  
The above findings lead us to conclude that the more companies follow the ASB (2006) 
guidelines for achieving best practice with regard to financial KPIs disclosure quality, the more they 
benefit with regard to their ICC. The same does not apply to nonfinancial KPIs disclosure quality. 
In fact, our results show that this type of information does not affect the cost of equity capital.  
TABLE 8 – ABOUT HERE 
Table 9 reports the results regarding our second set of hypotheses. As in the case with regard to the 
tests relating to the ICC, the aggregate measure for the quality of KPI disclosure is not correlated 
significantly with the market value (MV). This result also holds irrespective of whether the overall 
KPI disclosure quality has been captured in the Business Review or the annual report as a whole.  
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However, when looking at the disaggregated effect of the disclosure quality of the financial and 
nonfinancial KPIs on the market value, we again note that only the financial KPI disclosure quality 
has a positive and significant coefficient. The results hold irrespective of the transformation applied 
for the quality score and whether the quality score relates to the KPIs disclosed in the annual report 
as a whole (1.348, p<0.05, for dense rankings; 0.320, p<0.10, for normal scores) or in the Business 
Review only (1.349, p<0.10, for dense rankings; 0.321, p<0.10, for normal scores). These findings 
suggest that this type of information is value relevant. In fact, drawing on the coefficient of 
FKPIsRep_rank (FKPIsSec_rank) and considering that the values of this variable lie between zero 
and one (see Equation 3 above), the results indicate the following. The firm with the highest quality 
of Financial KPIs reporting in our sample benefits by a 1.348% (1.349%) increase in its market 
price per share compared to the firm with the lowest quality of Financial KPIs reporting in our 
sample. 
TABLE 9 – ABOUT HERE 
The results reported for financial KPIs confirm the hypothesised economic consequence of 
disclosure. On the one hand, the literature suggests that corporate disclosure should reduce the cost 
of capital by enhancing the market liquidity (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Easley and 
O’Hara, 2004) or reducing the estimation risk (e.g., Hughes et al., 2007; Lambert et al., 2007). On 
the other hand, corporate disclosure is able to affect managers’ decisions, thus altering the 
distribution of future cash flows, which indirectly affects firm value (Lambert et al., 2007). In line 
with this literature, our results show that financial KPI disclosure quality reduces the cost of capital 
and is somewhat value relevant, meaning that this specific type of information is useful to investors 
and is able to reduce information asymmetries. Additionally, our results complement those of 
Iatridis (2008; 2011) who finds that UK firms having higher needs for capital provide disclosures of 
higher quality, suggesting that UK firms which make additional effort to provide disclosures of 
better quality achieving a reduction in their cost of capital. The fact that the significance of the two 
relations is different (strong for the ICC and weak for the firm value) is supported by the literature 
 26 
on the independent movements of the cost of capital and the firm value because of corporate 
disclosure (Pope and McLeay, 2011). Finally, we note that, as shown in Table 5 (Panel A), most of 
the financial KPIs reported relate to earnings, cash flows and rates of return. Thus, the results in 
Tables 8 and 9 regarding the relationship between quality of financial KPIs disclosure quality are in 
line with prior literature showing that earnings related information is value relevant for investors 
(e.g., Athanasoukou and Hussainey, 2014; Hussainey et al., 2003; Wang and Hussainey, 2013).  
The results for nonfinancial KPIs can be interpreted in light of the CA (2006), which points out 
that these should only be disclosed ‘when appropriate’, thus being a sort of secondary source of 
information. Hence, managers are probably either ineffective at disclosing nonfinancial KPIs which 
are informative to investors or are reporting useful information but without a quality level which is 
sufficient for investors to get useful information. The latter is supported by the descriptive statistics 
in Tables 3 and 4 where we show that, on average, financial KPI disclosure quality is significantly 
higher than nonfinancial KPIs. Moreover, nonfinancial KPIs are extremely firm specific as we show 
in Table 5, where we document a very low percentage of frequency for the 10 most commonly 
nonfinancial KPIs reported. This variance in reporting of this type of information may result in 
investors to be provided with less comparable information compared to financial KPIs. 
Alternatively, such non-financial information might not be viewed as useful by investors anyway. 
All these might be the reasons for nonfinancial KPIs being value irrelevant.  
Overall, we conclude that the more companies follow the ASB (2006) guidelines for achieving 
best practice with regard to financial KPIs disclosure quality, the more they benefit in terms of the 
cost of capital and their market value. 
 
5. Sensitivity analyses and additional tests18 
First, given the debate surrounding the validity of ICC measures, we rerun our regressions that 
identify the link between KPI disclosure quality and the cost of capital by using a single measure 
                                                          
18 Tables reporting the relevant information discussed in this section are available on request. 
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for the ICC. In particular, we use the 𝑟𝑀𝑃𝐸𝐺  (Easton, 2004), since previous studies suggest that is 
best for ICC measures employing analyst forecasts (Botosan et al., 2011; Clarkson et al., 2013). 
Using this measure reduces our sample from 448 to 415 firm-year observations because of the 
difficulty in solving the equation with the 𝑟𝑀𝑃𝐸𝐺 . The results are the same as in the previous section: 
overall KPIs’ disclosure quality is again not significantly correlated with ICC (negative sign of the 
coefficient). The financial KPI disclosure quality holds irrespective of the transformation applied 
for the quality scores and whether these are related to the KPIs disclosed in the annual report as a 
whole (-0.027, p<0.01, for dense rankings; -0.007, p<0.05, for normal scores) or in the Business 
Review only (-0.025, p<0.05, for dense rankings; -0.006, p<0.05, for normal scores). The Hausman 
test shows again no endogeneity problem in the OLS regressors estimation. 
Second, because of the reduced sample size, we also rerun the regressions that identify the 
value relevance of the KPI disclosure quality. Once again, our results are robust in that the 
aggregate measure for the quality of the KPI disclosure and the nonfinancial KPIs are not correlated 
significantly with the market value. However, financial KPI disclosure quality is value relevant. In 
fact, the results of these additional tests, show a strong positive relation between the KPI disclosure 
quality and the market value when financial KPIs are disclosed in the annual report (1.453, p<0.05, 
for dense rankings; 0.366, p<0.05, for normal scores) or only in the Business Review (1.449, 
p<0.05, for dense rankings; 0.362, p<0.05, for normal scores). 
Third, we reflect on our measure for the KPIs disclosure quality and we explore an alternative 
approach. We create a new measure for KPIs disclosure quality, which is inspired by the Saidin 
Index (Hodgdon et al., 2008) and does weight not equally the quality of each KPI. This new 
measure is a weighted average where the weights are calculated by considering the number of times 
a KPIs has been disclosed in a specific year in our sample. The weight applied to each KPI is 
calculated as the ratio between the times that k-th KPI was disclosed (numerator) on the number of 
KPIs disclosed for the full sample in a given year (denominator). Untubulated descriptive statistics 
as well as T-tests (Mann-Whitney tests) confirm that the means (medians) of our new measure for 
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Overall and Financial KPIs disclosure quality are significantly different (p<0.05) from the ones we 
employ in the results discussed in the previous section. Subsequently, we employ our new measure 
in multivariate analyses. In order to be consistent with our main tests, we also transformed it 
employing percentile rankings and normal scores. Our new tests reveal a negative and significant 
relationship between the weighted index and ICC (p<0.05) compared to insignificant relationship 
reported in the previous section. These results can be explained based on the rationale we use in 
developing our new measure for KPIs disclosure quality. Our new measure weights KPIs according 
to their ‘popularity’. Given that financial KPIs are more ‘popular’ than nonfinancial KPIs, the new 
measure for the overall quality of KPIs is more influenced by financial than by nonfinancial KPIs. 
In fact, when exploring the relationship between the disclosure quality of financial KPIs and ICC, 
results employing our new weighted measure are consistent with those reported in the main tests 
presented earlier. We find a negative and statistically significant relationship between our weighted 
measure and ICC (p<0.05). Finally, the results with regard to the second hypothesis become 
weaker, as we find no significant relation between our weighted measure and market values 
Fourth, we also analyse the link between the KPI disclosure quantity and the ICC, as well as its 
value relevance. When performing these tests, beyond using dense rankings and normal scores, we 
use two additional transformations: the square root and the log-transformation. These two result in 
loosing many observations when either the number of financial or nonfinancial KPIs disclosed as 
zero. The results show that none of the KPI disclosure quantity dimensions (overall, financial, and 
nonfinancial) is related to the cost of capital or is value relevant. These results are consistent with 
the FRC (2007, 2009) reports which draw attention to the quality rather than the quantity of KPI 
reporting. In fact, reporting a large number of KPIs does not appear to reduce information 
asymmetries. The disclosure of KPIs without directors defining, explaining, and linking each KPI to 
the financial or nonfinancial performance of the company results in the provision of uninterpretable 
information, which does not have an impact on the cost of equity capital and the market value. 
 
 29 
6. Conclusions 
We contribute to the disclosure literature by being the first study to measure the quality of KPI 
reporting in companies’ annual reports and examining its economic consequences. In particular, we 
analyse the impact of KPI disclosure quality on firms’ cost of capital and firm value. In order to 
measure the quality of corporate disclosure, we use a manual content analysis that considers all of 
the qualitative attributes of the information suggested by the ASB (2006) statement of best practice. 
An average of four models is used to estimate the ICC. Our analyses are based on a panel data set of 
448 UK annual reports throughout the period of 2006 to 2010.  
Although a substantial body of literature exists on the economic consequences of disclosure in 
general, very little is known about the role of KPI reporting which is brought forward by regulators. 
Our findings indicate that only the disclosure quality of financial KPIs has a strong negative impact 
on the ICC and a weak positive relation with firm value. In fact, the quantity of KPI reporting has 
no effect on the cost of capital or the market value. 
Policy makers can take some comfort from the evidence that the KPIs reporting on financial 
KPIs does have an influence, but they might also be interested in exploring why the quality of 
nonfinancial KPIs is relatively low and does not result in any economic consequences. Our study 
should also be relevant to compilers of annual reports because firms’ good disclosure practices on 
financial KPIs lead to a reduction in the ICC and to higher market value, while just disclosing high 
numbers of KPIs does not result in any benefit. 
This study is subject to limitations. Although the measures of the ICC that we use are those 
most commonly used in the literature, there is an ongoing debate on which measures provide a good 
proxy for the cost of equity capital. Moreover, sample firms are based on the FTSE 350, which is 
among the most liquid and important UK firms. This leaves an open research question about the 
economic consequences of the quality of the KPIs disclosure among smaller and less liquid firms in 
the UK or in other countries. This question provides a clear avenue for future research given that 
KPIs disclosure is mandatory across the EU. 
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Table 1 – Sample summary statistics 
PANEL A – SAMPLE SELECTION PROCESS 
The sample selection starting point is the top 350 UK firms based on market capitalisation, according to the 
Financial Times’ 2011 ranking. Financial firms are excluded. Subsequently, 102 firms are randomly selected, 
while representation of each industry is maintained at the same proportion as in the initial samples. In order 
to maintain this proportion, systematic sampling is used by choosing as a starting point the first company in 
every industry according to its market capitalisation, then by selecting the third, the fifth and so on. 
510 starting observations [102 firms for 5 years (𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟔;𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟕;𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖;𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟗; 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎)] 
n observations 
excluded thereafter Reason for exclusion 
2 KPI’s regulation not applicable in 2006 (because of year-end date) 
27 no analyst following 
31 missing data on DataStream or IBES 
2 unable to solve at least one ICC model because of data unavailability 
62 total number of observations excluded 
448 final sample 
PANEL B – SAMPLE CONSTITUENTS BY INDUSTRY a 
Industry Frequency Percentage 
Basic Materials 35 7.8 
Consumer Goods 60 13.4 
Consumer Services 84 18.7 
Health Care 20 4.5 
Industrials 144 32.1 
Oil & Gas 41 9.2 
Technology 34 7.6 
Telecommunications 10 2.2 
Utilities 20 4.5 
TOTAL 448 100.0 
a Industries are listed according to the Industry Classification Benchmark. 
 
 
 
Table 2 – Descriptive statistics for independent variables 
Variable n Mean St. dev 25th perc Median 75th perc 
MV a 448 7.46 17.30         0.59 1.24 3.65  
BV a 448 3.35 11.60 0.19 0.49 1.71  
M2B 448 4.46  11.21  1.64 2.72  4.06 
NI a 448 0.43  1.80  0.03  0.07 0.22  
Sal a 448 5.94     19.70  0.53  1.34  3.60  
SalG 448 0.17  0.39  0.03 0.10  0.22 
TA a 448 8.07 22.70 0.60     1.39 5.06  
AWCA 448 0.04  0.04  0.01 0.02  0.05 
NOSH b 448 1.30  5.75  0.132 0.288 0.883 
rVar 448 0.008  0.014  0.002 0.003  0.009 
Dispersion 448 3.29  7.54  0.73 1.53  3.46 
AnFollow 448 14 7 8 13 18 
MV is the market value of equity (WC08001); BV is the book value of equity (WC03501); M2B is the market 
value to the book value of equity (WC08001/WC03501); NI is the net income (WC01751); Sal is the sales 
(WC01001); SalG is the sales growth computed as (𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡 − 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1)/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1; TA is the total assets 
(WC02999); AWCA is the absolute value of the abnormal working capital accruals scaled by the end-of-the-
year total assets calculated according to Marra et al. (2011); NOSH is the number of shares (NOSH); rVar is 
the return variance over the financial year computed as 𝑙𝑛 (𝑅𝐼𝑡−11/𝑅𝐼𝑡0); Dispersion is the EPS forecasts 
standard deviation from IBES (STDEV); and AnFollow is the number of analysts following from IBES 
(NUMEST). 
a GBP billions. 
b Billions. 
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Table 3 – KPIs disclosure quality in the annual report a 
PANEL A – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY YEAR  
Statistics 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2006-2010 
 Overall Fin NFin Overall Fin NFin Overall Fin NFin Overall Fin NFin Overall Fin NFin Overall Fin NFin 
Mean 0.29 0.27 0.22 0.36 0.33 0.29 0.40 0.38 0.34 0.42 0.39 0.37 0.44 0.41 0.40 0.38 0.36 0.33 
St. dev. 0.19 0.19 0.25 0.18 0.18 0.26 0.15 0.16 0.25 0.15 0.16 0.25 0.13 0.14 0.24 0.17 0.18 0.25 
Median 0.31 0.29 0.14 0.38 0.38 0.29 0.41 0.38 0.36 0.43 0.39 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.46 0.41 0.38 0.36 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 0.67 0.71 0.86 0.63 0.69 0.86 0.69 0.69 0.79 0.87 0.76 0.86 0.76 0.76 0.86 0.87 0.76 0.86 
N 88 89 91 88 92 448 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FINANCIAL AND NON FINANCIAL KPIs 
T-test 1.865** 1.620* 1.617* 0.790 0.525 2.872*** 
Wilcoxon 1.941* 0.826 1.037 0.112 -0.236 1.717* 
PANEL B – TEST FOR TREND 
  Overall Fin NFin   
 Cuzick test b 5.630*** 5.470*** 4.890***   
Follow-up Tests 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 Overall Fin NFin Overall Fin NFin Overall Fin NFin Overall Fin NFin 
T-test -2.272** -2.355*** -1.894** -1.913** -1.721** -1.125 -0.632 -0.488 -0.886 -1.16 -1.165 -0.944 
Mann-Whitney -2.343** -2.480** -1.806* -1.487 -1.454 -1.116 -0.592 -0.436 -0.862 -1.191 -1.117 -0.922 
PANEL C – FREQUENCY BY GROUP AND YEAR  
Groups c 2006 n (%) 2007 n (%) 2008 n (%) 2009 n (%) 2010 n (%) 2006-2010 n (%) 
 Overall Fin NFin Overall Fin NFin Overall Fin NFin Overall Fin NFin Overall Fin NFin Overall Fin NFin 
0-10 20 (22%) 
24 
(27%) 
42 
(48%) 
12 
(13%) 
14 
(16%) 
33 
(37%) 
4 
(5%) 
7  
(8%) 
25 
(27%) 
4 
(5%) 
6 
(7%) 
20 
(23%) 
2 
(2%) 
4 
(5%) 
17 
(18%) 
42 
(9%) 
55 
(12%) 
137 
(31%) 
11-20 4 (5%) 
4 
(5%) 
5 
(6%) 
2 
(2%) 
3 
(3%) 
2 
(2%) 
2 
(2%) 
3  
(3%) 
3 
(3%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(1%) 
3 
(4%) 
1 
(1%) 
0 
(0%) 
2 
(2%) 
9 
(2%) 
11 
(3%) 
15 
(3%) 
21-30 19 (22%) 
19 
(22%) 
9 
(10%) 
14 
(16%) 
13 
(15%) 
11 
(12%) 
15 
(16%) 
14  
(15%) 
12 
(13%) 
15 
(17%) 
18 
(20%) 
8 
(9%) 
13 
(14%) 
14 
(15%) 
8 
(9%) 
76 
(17%) 
78 
(17%) 
48 
(11%) 
31-40 17 (19%) 
21 
(24%) 
5 
(6%) 
20 
(23%) 
25 
(28%) 
3 
(3%) 
22 
(24%) 
28  
(31%) 
6 
(7%) 
21 
(24%) 
24 
(28%) 
8 
(9%) 
13 
(14%) 
22 
(24%) 
9 
(10%) 
93 
(21%) 
120 
(27%) 
31 
(7%) 
41-50 14 (16%) 
10 
(11%) 
11 
(13%) 
20 
(23%) 
21 
(24%) 
14 
(16%) 
24 
(26%) 
16  
(18%) 
16 
(17%) 
23 
(26%) 
18 
(20%) 
18 
(20%) 
32 
(35%) 
28 
(30%) 
22 
(24%) 
113 
(25%) 
93 
(21%) 
81 
(18%) 
51-60 10 (11%) 
6 
(7%) 
12 
(15%) 
18 
(20%) 
9 
(10%) 
18 
(21%) 
17 
(19%) 
18  
(20%) 
18 
(20%) 
20 
(22%) 
14 
(16%) 
18 
(20%) 
22 
(24%) 
17 
(18%) 
19 
(21%) 
87 
(19%) 
64 
(14%) 
86 
(19%) 
61-70 4 (5%) 
3 
(3 %) 
1 
(1%) 
3 
(3%) 
4 
(4%) 
5 
(6%) 
7 
(8%) 
5  
(5%) 
5 
(6%) 
4 
(5%) 
6 
(7%) 
8 
(9%) 
7 
(8%) 
6 
(7%) 
7 
(8%) 
25 
(6%) 
24 
(5%) 
26 
(6%) 
71-80 0 (0%) 
1 
(1%) 
1 
(1%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
2 
(2%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
6 
(7%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(1%) 
4 
(5%) 
2 
(2%) 
1 
(1%) 
5 
(5%) 
2 
(0%) 
3 
(1%) 
18 
(4%) 
81-90 0 (0%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(1%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(1%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(1%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(1%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
3 
(3%) 
1 
(1%) 
0 
(0%) 
6 
(1%) 
91-100 0 (0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
N 88 89 91 88 92 448 
a Overall is a measure of the quality of financial and nonfinancial KPIs. Disclosure quality is measured as the compliance with the OFR best practice guidance (ASB, 2006). 
See subsection 3.2 for a detailed description of the measure of the KPI’s disclosure quality. Fin and NFin indicate the quality of financial and nonfinancial KPIs respectively.  
b The Cuzick (1985) test is the non-parametric test for the trend across ordered groups. c Groups are defined as the percentage of disclosure quality of KPIs, where zero means 
the poorest quality and 100% means the best practice. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 4 –KPIs disclosure quality in the Business Review only a 
PANEL A – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY YEAR  
Statistics 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2006-2010 
 Overall Fin NFin Overall Fin NFin Overall Fin NFin Overall Fin NFin Overall Fin NFin Overall Fin NFin 
Mean 0.28 0.27 0.19 0.35 0.33 0.26 0.39 0.38 0.29 0.41 0.39 0.31 0.43 0.41 0.34 0.37 0.36 0.28 
St. dev. 0.20 0.19 0.24 0.18 0.18 0.26 0.15 0.16 0.25 0.15 0.16 0.25 0.14 0.14 0.25 0.17 0.18 0.25 
Median 0.29 0.29 0.00 0.38 0.38 0.29 0.40 0.38 0.29 0.40 0.39 0.31 0.44 0.43 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.29 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 0.71 0.71 0.86 0.69 0.69 0.86 0.69 0.69 0.79 0.68 0.76 0.79 0.72 0.76 0.86 0.72 0.76 0.86 
N 88 89 91 88 92 448 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FINANCIAL AND NON FINANCIAL KPIs 
T-test 3.187*** 2.839*** 3.347*** 3.093*** 2.951*** 6.921*** 
Wilcoxon 2.938*** 1.793* 2.587*** 2.341** 2.157** 5.307*** 
PANEL B – TEST FOR TREND 
  Overall Fin NFin   
 Cuzick test b 5.210*** 5.470*** 3.910***   
Follow-up Tests 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 Overall Fin NFin Overall Fin NFin Overall Fin NFin Overall Fin NFin 
T-test -2.328 -2.355*** -1.946** -1.749** -1.721** -0.773 -0.497 -0.488 -0.383 -1.111 -1.165 -0.949 
Mann-Whitney -2.394** -2.475** -1.884* -1.363 -1.452 -0.738 -0.342 -0.434 -0.398 -1.030 -1.117 -0.927 
PANEL C – FREQUENCY BY GROUP AND YEAR  
Groups c 2006 n (%) 2007 n (%) 2008 n (%) 2009 n (%) 2010 n (%) 2006-2010 n (%) 
 Overall Fin NFin Overall Fin NFin Overall Fin NFin Overall Fin NFin Overall Fin NFin Overall Fin NFin 
0-10 22 (25%) 
24 
(27%) 
48 
(55%) 
13 
(15%) 
14 
(16%) 
38 
(43%) 
5 
(5%) 
7 
(8%) 
32 
(35%) 
4 
(4%) 
6 
(7%) 
28 
(32%) 
2 
(2%) 
4 
(4%) 
25 
(27%) 
46 
(10%) 
55 
(12%) 
171 
(38%) 
11-20 5 (6%) 
5 
(6%) 
5 
(6%) 
3 
(3%) 
3 
(3%) 
2 
(2%) 
3 
(3%) 
3 
(3%) 
3 
(3%) 
0 
(0) 
1 
(1%) 
3 
(3%) 
1 
(1%) 
0 
(0%) 
2 
(2%) 
12 
(3%) 
12 
(2%) 
15 
(3%) 
21-30 18 (21%) 
19 
(22%) 
9 
(10%) 
14 
(16%) 
14 
(16%) 
11 
(12%) 
16 
(18%) 
15 
(17%) 
13 
(14%) 
19 
(22%) 
19 
(22%) 
10 
(11%) 
16 
(17%) 
15 
(16%) 
10 
(11%) 
83 
(18%) 
82 
(18%) 
53 
(12%) 
31-40 16 (18%) 
20 
(23%) 
3 
(3%) 
19 
(21%) 
24 
(27%) 
3 
(3%) 
21 
(23%) 
29 
(32%) 
4 
(4%) 
21 
(24%) 
23 
(26%) 
8 
(9%) 
17 
(18%) 
23 
(25%) 
9 
(10%) 
94 
(21%) 
119 
(27%) 
27 
(6%) 
41-50 13 (15%) 
10 
(11%) 
9 
(10%) 
20 
(23%) 
21 
(24%) 
12 
(14%) 
22 
(24%) 
14 
(15%) 
15 
(17%) 
22 
(25%) 
18 
(20%) 
18 
(21%) 
29 
(32%) 
26 
(28%) 
23 
(25%) 
106 
(24%) 
89 
(20%) 
77 
(17%) 
51-60 10 (11%) 
6 
(7%) 
12 
(14%) 
17 
(19%) 
9 
(10%) 
16 
(18%) 
18 
(20%) 
18 
(20%) 
15 
(17%) 
16 
(18%) 
15 
(17%) 
10 
(11%) 
18 
(20%) 
18 
(21%) 
12 
(13%) 
79 
(18%) 
66 
(15%) 
65 
(15%) 
61-70 3 (3%) 
3 
(3%) 
0 
(0%) 
3 
(3%) 
4 
(4%) 
4 
(5%) 
6 
(7%) 
5 
(5%) 
4 
(4%) 
6 
(7%) 
5 
(6%) 
7 
(8%) 
8 
(9%) 
5 
(5%) 
4 
(4%) 
26 
(6%) 
22 
(5%) 
19 
(4%) 
71-80 1 (1%) 
1 
(1%) 
1 
(1%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
2 
(2%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
5 
(6%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(1%) 
4 
(5%) 
1 
(1%) 
1 
(1%) 
6 
(7%) 
2 
(0%) 
3 
(1%) 
18 
(4%) 
81-90 0 (0%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(1%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(1%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(1%) 
46 
(10%) 
0 
(0%) 
3 
(1%) 
91-100 0 (0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
N 88 89 91 88 92 448 
a Overall is a measure of the quality of financial and nonfinancial KPIs. Disclosure quality is measured as the compliance with the OFR best practice guidelines (ASB, 2006). 
See subsection 3.2 for a detailed description of the measure of the KPI’s disclosure quality. Fin and NFin indicate the quality of financial and nonfinancial KPIs respectively. 
b The Cuzick (1985) test is a nonparametric test for the trend across ordered groups. c Groups are defined as the percentage of disclosure quality of KPIs, where zero means 
the poorest quality and 100% means the best practice. The *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 5 – FREQUENCES OF REPORTED KPIs AND THE QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS RELATED TO KPIs REPORTED 
PANEL A – TEN MOST COMMONLY REPORTED KPIs a 
Financial and NonFinancial combined Financial NonFinancial 
KPI n % KPI n % KPI n % 
Earnings per share 258 58% Earnings per share 258 58% Employee accidents 89 20% 
Cash flow 255 57% Cash flow 255 57% Lost time incidents 76 17% 
Revenue 239 53% Revenue 239 53% Carbon dioxide emissions 43 10% 
Operating profit 134 30% Operating profit 134 30% Staff turnover 34 8% 
Sales 117 26% Sales 117 26% Water consumption 25 6% 
Employee accidents 89 20% Operating margin 84 19% Employee engagement 24 5% 
Operating margin 84 19% Return on capital employed 80 18% Employee numbers 24 5% 
Return on capital employed 80 18% Dividends 62 14% Energy consumption 10 2% 
Lost time incidents 76 17% Return on sales 60 13% Management turnover 9 2% 
Dividends 62 14% Capital Expenditure 59 13% Backlog 8 2% 
PANEL B – QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS’ BREAKDOWN b,c 
Qualitative 
Characteristic d 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2006-2010 
 
Overall 
n=560 
Fin 
n=392 
NFin 
n=168 
Overall 
n=710 
Fin 
n=448 
NFin 
n=262 
Overall 
n=794 
Fin 
n=512 
NFin 
n=282 
Overall 
n=859 
Fin 
n=520 
NFin 
n=339 
Overall 
n=919 
Fin 
n=550 
NFin 
n=369 
Overall 
n=3,842 
Fin 
n=2,422 
NFin 
n=1,420 
Definition 97% 97% 95% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 97% 98% 98% 97% 98% 99% 97% 98% 98% 97% 
Purpose 43% 39% 54% 49% 45% 56% 58% 51% 71% 63% 59% 70% 71% 65% 80% 59% 53% 69% 
Source of data 27% 28% 26% 31% 31% 32% 41% 38% 47% 39% 37% 44% 40% 37% 45% 37% 34% 41% 
Quantified target 6% 4% 13% 12% 9% 17% 12% 7% 21% 13% 8% 21% 15% 9% 24% 12% 7% 20% 
Commentary 2% 1% 2% 5% 5% 5% 5% 3% 8% 7% 5% 9% 10% 8% 13% 6% 5% 9% 
Comparison with 
previous year 
89% 91% 84% 91% 94% 84% 91% 96% 83% 88% 93% 79% 90% 94% 83% 90% 94% 83% 
Adjustments 14% 13% N.A. 18% 17% N.A. 23% 23% N.A. 24% 24% N.A. 24% 24% N.A. 21% 21% N.A. 
Changes 4% 4% 3% 5% 7% 2% 8% 6% 11% 8% 7% 11% 7% 6% 7% 7% 6% 7% 
a % indicates the percentage relative to the total number of observations (n=448) 
b % indicates the ratio between the number of times a qualitative characteristic was disclosed to the total number of times this characteristic was applicable to a KPI. This may 
vary depending on the number of KPIs disclosed each year in each category (overall, financial and nonfinancial) and on the times it was applicable. 
c Overall stands for financial and nonfinancial KPIs combined. Fin and NFin indicate financial and nonfinancial KPIs respectively. 
d Qualitative characteristics for KPIs disclosure  as suggested by the OFR (ASB, 2006) are explained in Appendix A. 
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Table 6 – Information regarding the implied cost of capital (ICC) 
PANEL A – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR ICC (𝒓𝑨𝑽) 
Statistics 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2006-2010 
Mean 0.087 0.099 0.126 0.100 0.098 0.102 
St. dev. 0.052 0.047 0.097 0.059 0.060 0.067 
Median 0.079 0.094 0.109 0.097 0.092 0.094 
Min 0.021 0.020 0.024 0.020 0.018 0.018 
Max 0.448 0.354 0.840 0.377 0.344 0.840 
N 88 89 91 88 92 448 
PANEL B – TEST FOR TREND IN ICC (𝒓𝑨𝑽) 
Cuzick test a   2.180 
Follow-up Tests 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 
Mann-Whitney -3.697*** -3.343*** 2.669*** 0.827 
T-test -1.697** -2.304** 2.136** 0.275 
PANEL C – PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR different measures of ICC (𝒓𝑨𝑽) 
 𝑟𝐶𝑇  𝑟𝐺𝐿𝑆 𝑟𝐺𝑀 𝑟𝑀𝑃𝐸𝐺  𝑟𝐴𝑉 
𝑟𝐶𝑇  1     
𝑟𝐺𝐿𝑆 0.901*** 1    
𝑟𝐺𝑀 0.756*** 0.745*** 1   
𝑟𝑀𝑃𝐸𝐺  0.707*** 0.792*** 0.863*** 1  
𝑟𝐴𝑉 0.908*** 0.945*** 0.924*** 0.915*** 1 
𝑟𝐴𝑉 refers to an average measure of the implied cost of equity capital, calculated as the mean of the following 
measures (c.f., Hail and Leuz, 2006): 𝑟𝐶𝑇  (Claus and Thomas, 2001), 𝑟𝐺𝐿𝑆 (Gebhardt et al., 2001), 𝑟𝐺𝑀 (Gode 
and Mohanran, 2003), 𝑟𝑀𝑃𝐸𝐺  (Easton, 2004). See Appendix C for a brief description of each measure.  
a The Cuzick (1985) test is a non-parametric test for the trend across ordered groups.  
The *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 7 – Pearson’s correlation coefficients 
 rAV a MV a OvKPIsRep rank 
FKPIsRep 
rank 
NonFKPIsRep 
rank 
OvKPIsRep 
norm 
FKPIsRep 
norm 
NonFKPIsRep 
norm 
OvKPIsSec 
rank 
FKPIsSec 
rank 
NonFKPIsSec 
rank 
rAV a 1           
MV a -0.192*** 1          
OvKPIsRep_rank  -0.129*** 0.326*** 1         
FKPIsRep_rank  -0.181*** 0.361*** 0.852*** 1        
NonFKPIsRep_rank -0.025 0.168*** 0.678*** 0.427*** 1       
OvKPIsRep_norm -0.121*** 0.321*** 0.981*** 0.850*** 0.680*** 1      
FKPIsRep_norm  -0.160*** 0.354*** 0.819*** 0.981*** 0.426*** 0.846*** 1     
NonFKPIsRep_norm  -0.038 0.159*** 0.641*** 0.412*** 0.986*** 0.656*** 0.419*** 1    
OvKPIsSec_rank  -0.151*** 0.348*** 0.940*** 0.909*** 0.588*** 0.927*** 0.884*** 0.560*** 1   
FKPIsSec_rank  -0.179*** 0.359*** 0.853*** 0.919*** 0.426*** 0.850*** 0.981*** 0.411*** 0.910*** 1  
NonFKPIsSec_rank -0.040 0.154*** 0.581*** 0.439*** 0.823*** 0.582*** 0.431*** 0.825*** 0.618*** 0.438*** 1 
OvKPIsSec_norm -0.143*** 0.348*** 0.911*** 0.904*** 0.581*** 0.933*** 0.911*** 0.564*** 0.980*** 0.904*** 0.602*** 
FKPIsSec_norm  -0.158*** 0.353*** 0.820*** 0.982*** 0.425*** 0.846*** 0.908*** 0.418*** 0.885*** 0.981*** 0.430*** 
NonFKPIsSec_norm  -0.048 0.155*** 0.534*** 0.415*** 0.788*** 0.546*** 0.411*** 0.813*** 0.576*** 0.413*** 0.927*** 
BV a -0.171*** 0.877*** 0.317*** 0.339*** 0.229*** 0.311*** 0.338*** 0.223*** 0.334*** 0.338*** 0.241*** 
M2B a -0.134*** 0.022 0.008 0.020 0.008 0.005 -0.002 0.023 0.016 0.019 0.018 
NI  a -0.202*** 0.906*** 0.305*** 0.332*** 0.155*** 0.302*** 0.326*** 0.149*** 0.325*** 0.330*** 0.138*** 
SalG a -0.054 -0.057 -0.074 -0.025 -0.059 -0.067 -0.021 -0.032 -0.049 -0.024 -0.032 
AWCA a 0.009 -0.113** -0.052 -0.026 -0.003 -0.033 -0.016 0.015 -0.027 -0.028 0.046 
rVar a 0.245*** -0.166*** -0.118** -0.091* -0.133*** -0.112** -0.085* -0.133*** -0.094** -0.092* -0.097** 
Dispersion a 0.325*** 0.052 0.047 0.016 0.025 0.025 0.002 0.015 0.026 0.017 0.030 
AnFollow -0.186*** 0.581*** 0.281*** 0.301*** 0.237*** 0.274*** 0.291*** 0.234*** 0.302*** 0.297*** 0.249*** 
(continued next page) 
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 OvKPIsSec norm 
FKPIsSec 
norm 
NonFKPIsSec 
norm BV 
a M2B a NI a SalG a AWCA a rVar a Dispersion a AnFollow 
OvKPIsSec_norm 1           
FKPIsSec_norm  0.911*** 1          
NonFKPIsSec_norm  0.571*** 0.412*** 1         
BV a 0.334*** 0.336*** 0.233*** 1        
M2B a 0.012 -0.003 0.030 -0.116** 1       
NI a 0.326*** 0.325*** 0.132*** 0.774*** 0.025 1      
SalG a -0.041 -0.021 -0.006 -0.039 0.028 -0.024 1     
AWCA a -0.011 -0.018 0.059 -0.113** 0.165*** -0.100** 0.127*** 1    
rVar a -0.086* -0.085* -0.094** -0.129*** -0.103** -0.146*** 0.113** 0.155*** 1   
Dispersion a 0.002 0.002 0.021 -0.20 -0.082* 0.057 0.047 0.016 0.185*** 1  
AnFollow 0.293*** 0.289*** 0.236*** 0.520*** 0.100** 0.548*** -0.130*** -0.064 -0.189*** -0.022 1 
𝑟𝐴𝑉 refers to an average measure of the implied cost of equity capital, calculated as the mean of the following measures (c.f., Hail and Leuz, 2006): 𝑟𝐶𝑇  (Claus and Thomas, 
2001), 𝑟𝐺𝐿𝑆 (Gebhardt et al., 2001), 𝑟𝐺𝑀 (Gode and Mohanran, 2003),  and 𝑟𝑀𝑃𝐸𝐺  (Easton, 2004). See Appendix C for a brief description of each measure.  
OvKPIs is a measure of the quality of financial and nonfinancial KPIs. Disclosure quality is measured as compliance with the OFR (ASB, 2006). See subsection 3.2 for a 
detailed description of the measure of KPI disclosure quality. FKPIs and NFinKPIs indicate the quality of financial and nonfinancial KPIs respectively. Suffix Rep means that 
KPI quality was measured throughout the whole annual report. Suffix Sec means that KPI quality was measured in the Business Review section only. Suffixes rank and norm 
mean that KPI quality was transformed using percentile ranking and normal scores respectively. For the calculation of these variables see subsection 3.2. 
MV is market value of equity (WC08001); BV is book value of equity (WC03501); M2B is the market value to book value of equity (WC08001/WC03501); NI is net income 
(WC01751); SalG is sales growth computed as (𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡 − 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1)/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1 (WC01001); AWCA is the absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals scaled by end-
of-the-year total assets, calculated according to Marra et al. (2011); rVar is the return variance over the financial year computed as 𝑙𝑛 (𝑅𝐼𝑡−11/𝑅𝐼𝑡0); Dispersion is the EPS 
forecasts standard deviation from IBES (STDEV); and AnFollow is the number of analysts following from IBES (NUMEST). 
a Variables winsorised at the 2nd and 98th percentiles. 
The *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 8 – Determinants of ICC (𝒓𝑨𝑽) and KPIs disclosure quality  
 Quality of KPIs disclosed  
in Annual Report 
Quality of KPIs disclosed  
in KPIs’ Section 
 Overall Financial & Nonfinancial Overall 
Financial & 
Nonfinancial 
Constant 0.109***  
(8.24) 
0.102***  
(7.58) 
0.109***  
(8.03) 
0.102***  
(7.35) 
0.109***  
(8.05) 
0.101***  
(7.76) 
0.110*** 
 (7.84) 
0.102***  
(7.18) 
OvKPIsRep_rank  -0.016  (-1.45) 
       
FKPIsRep_rank    -0.029**  
(-2.53) 
     
NonFKPIsRep_rank   0.014  (1.23) 
     
OvKPIsRep_norm  -0.004  
(-1.26) 
      
FKPIsRep_norm     -0.007**  (-2.05) 
    
NonFKPIsRep_norm     0.003  
(0.92) 
    
OvKPIsSec_rank      -0.018  (-1.58) 
   
FKPIsSec_rank        -0.027**  
(-2.39) 
 
NonFKPIsSec_rank       0.011  (0.94) 
 
OvKPIsSec_norm      -0.004 
(-1.41) 
  
FKPIsSec_norm         -0.006*  (-1.92) 
NonFKPIsSec_norm         0.002  
(0.66) 
M2B a -0.001  (-1.14) 
-0.001  
(-1.14) 
-0.001  
(-1.13) 
-0.001  
(-1.17) 
-0.001  
(-1.15) 
-0.001  
(-1.15) 
-0.001  
(-1.13) 
-0.001  
(-1.17) 
SalG a -0.022  
(-1.03) 
-0.022  
(-1.03) 
-0.020  
(-0.95) 
-0.021  
(-0.97) 
-0.021  
(-1.00) 
-0.021  
(-1.00) 
-0.020  
(-0.96) 
-0.021  
(-0.97) 
AWCA a -0.011  
(-0.14) 
-0.009  
(-0.11) 
-0.013  
(-0.17) 
-0.011  
(-0.14) 
-0.008  
(-0.10) 
-0.006  
(-0.08) 
-0.017  
(-0.22) 
-0.013 
(-0.16) 
rVar a 0.750** 
 (2.29) 
0.757** 
 (2.29) 
0.792**  
(2.51) 
0.792**  
(2.48) 
0.760**  
(2.32) 
0.766**  
(2.30) 
0.773** 
 (2.42) 
0.776**  
(2.39) 
Dispersion a 0.004***  
(4.81) 
0.004***  
(4.77) 
0.004***  
(4.74) 
0.004***  
(4.69) 
0.004*** 
 (4.82) 
0.004*** 
 (4.76) 
0.004***  
(4.68) 
0.004***  
(4.64) 
AnFollow -0.001*  
(-1.79) 
-0.001*  
(-1.85) 
-0.001*  
(-1.67) 
-0.001*  
(-1.74) 
-0.001* 
 (-1.70) 
-0.001*  
(-1.78) 
-0.001*  
(-1.69) 
-0.001*  
(-1.76) 
N 448 448 448 448 448 448 448 448 
F 10.92*** 10.69*** 11.61*** 10.38*** 11.00*** 10.71*** 11.49*** 10.35*** 
R2-adj 0.174 0.172 0.188 0.180 0.177 0.174 0.185 0.178 
Max VIF 1.75 1.75 1.76 1.76 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 
Hausman test (X2)b 1.58 1.39 3.59 2.07 1.31 1.24 1.88 1.72 
𝑟𝐴𝑉 refers to an average measure of the implied cost of equity capital, calculated as the mean of the following 
measures (c.f., Hail and Leuz, 2006): 𝑟𝐶𝑇  (Claus and Thomas, 2001), 𝑟𝐺𝐿𝑆 (Gebhardt et al., 2001), 𝑟𝐺𝑀 (Gode 
and Mohanran, 2003), 𝑟𝑀𝑃𝐸𝐺  (Easton, 2004). See Appendix C for a brief description of each measure.  
OvKPIs is a measure of the quality of financial and nonfinancial KPIs. Disclosure quality is measured as 
compliance with OFR best practice guidelines (ASB, 2006). See subsection 3.2 for a detailed description of the 
measure of KPI disclosure quality. FKPIs and NFinKPIs indicate the quality of financial and non- financial 
KPIs respectively. Suffix Rep means that the KPI quality was measured throughout the whole annual report. 
Suffix Sec means that the KPI quality was measured in the Business Review section only. Suffixes rank and 
norm mean that the KPI quality was transformed using percentile ranking and normal scores respectively. For 
the calculation of these variables see subsection 3.2. 
M2B is the market value to book value of equity (WC08001/WC03501); SalG is sales growth computed as 
(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡 − 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1)/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1 (WC01001); AWCA is the absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals 
scaled by end-of-the-year total assets, calculated according to Marra et al. (2011); rVar is the return variance 
over the financial year computed as 𝑙𝑛 (𝑅𝐼𝑡−11/𝑅𝐼𝑡0); Dispersion is the EPS forecasts standard deviation from 
IBES (STDEV); and AnFollow is the number of analysts following from IBES (NUMEST). 
a Variables winsorised at the 2nd and 98th percentiles. 
b Hausman test is used to compare results from OLS and 2SLS regressions as discussed in Section 3.3. 
The *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 9 – Value relevance of accounting information and quality of KPIs disclosure 
 Quality of KPIs disclosed  
in Annual Report 
Quality of KPIs disclosed  
in KPIs’ Section 
 Overall Financial & Nonfinancial Overall 
Financial & 
Nonfinancial 
Constant 0.877* 
(1.72) 
1.244*** 
(3.12) 
0.747 
(1.60) 
1.327*** 
(2.68) 
0.830 
(1.161) 
1.271*** 
(3.24) 
0.757 
(1.61) 
1.304*** 
(2.73) 
BV a 
1.002*** 
(3.89) 
1.002*** 
(3.88) 
0.999*** 
(3.84) 
0.996*** 
(3.81) 
0.998*** 
(3.90) 
0.998*** 
(3.89) 
0.998*** 
(3.89) 
0.997*** 
(3.86) 
NI a 8.036*** 
(8.35) 
8.028*** 
(8.36) 
7.993*** 
(8.43) 
8.010*** 
(8.39) 
8.039*** 
(8.40) 
8.029*** 
(8.39) 
7.977*** 
(8.51) 
8.010*** 
(8.46) 
OvKPIsRep_rank  
0.696 
(0.96) 
 
 
     
FKPIsRep_rank  
  1.348** 
(2.02) 
     
NonFKPIsRep_rank   -0.300 
(-0.32)  
    
OvKPIsRep_norm  0.225 (1.12) 
 
 
    
FKPIsRep_norm  
   0.320* 
(1.76) 
    
NonFKPIsRep_norm     0.025 
(0.09) 
  
 
 
OvKPIsSec_rank  
    0.839 
(1.20) 
 
 
 
FKPIsSec_rank        1.349* 
(1.93) 
 
NonFKPIsSec_rank 
      -0.388 
(-0.41)  
OvKPIsSec_norm 
     0.268 
(1.39) 
 
 
FKPIsSec_norm  
       
0.321* 
(1.68) 
NonFKPIsSec_norm         
-0.005 
(-0.02) 
N 448 448 448 448 448 448 448 448 
F 205*** 205*** 156*** 155*** 205*** 205*** 157*** 157*** 
R2-adj 0.769 0.770 0.770 0.770 0.770 0.770 0.770 0.770 
Max VIF 1.98 1.97 1.98 1.98 1.98 1.98 2.00 2.00 
OvKPIs is a measure of the quality of financial and nonfinancial KPIs. Disclosure quality is measured as compliance 
with the OFR best practice guidelines (ASB, 2006). See subsection 3.2 for a detailed description of the measure of KPI 
disclosure quality. FKPIs and NFinKPIs indicate the quality of financial and nonfinancial KPIs respectively. Suffix Rep 
means that the KPI quality was measured throughout the whole annual report. Suffix Sec means that the KPI quality 
was measured in the Business Review section only. Suffixes rank and norm mean that the KPI quality was transformed 
using percentile ranking and normal scores respectively. For the calculation of these variables see subsection 3.2. 
MV is market value of equity (WC08001); BV is book value of equity (WC03501); and NI is net income (WC01751). 
a Variables winsorised at the 2nd and 98th percentiles 
The *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%s and 1% levels respectively. 
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APPENDIX A: Qualitative characteristics for KPIs disclosure (ASB, 2006) 
 
ASB (2006) (Paragraph 76, page 23): 
76. For each KPI disclosed in the OFR: 
1) the definition and its calculation method should be explained 
2) its purpose should be explained 
3) the source of underlying data should be disclosed and, where relevant, assumptions 
explained 
4) quantification or commentary on future targets should be provided 
5) where information from the financial statements has been adjusted for inclusion in the OFR, 
that fact should be highlighted and a reconciliation provided 
6) where available, the corresponding amount for the financial year immediately preceding the 
current year should be disclosed 
7) any changes to KPIs should be disclosed and the calculation method used compared to 
previous financial years, including significant changes in the underlying accounting policies 
adopted in the financial statements should be identified and explained. 
 
Reflecting on the examples provided by the Reporting Statement (ASB, 2006: pp. 29-38), we 
capture data related to item four as two different types of information (either quantitative or 
narrative discussion). This is why eight qualitative characteristics are listed in Table 5.  
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Appendix B – Example of measuring quantity and quality of KPIs reporting (Hypothetical firm A) 
 
N KPI name 
Definition 
and 
calculation 
method 
Purpose 
for 
disclosing 
Source of 
underlying 
data 
Quantification 
of future 
targets 
Commentary 
on future 
targets 
Corresponding 
amount for the 
previous 
financial year 
Information 
from the 
financial 
statements 
has been 
adjusted 
Changes to 
KPIs and 
the 
calculation 
method used 
compared to 
previous 
financial 
year 
KPI 
disclosure 
quality 
score 
1 Sales growth 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0.625 
2 Underlying volume 
growth 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0.625 
3 Operating margin 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.250 
4 Ungeared free cash 
flow 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0.625 
5 Return on invested 
capital 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0.625 
6 Total shareholder 
return 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.375 
Quantity of Financial 
KPIs:  6       
Quality of  
Financial KPIs: 0.521 
1 Total recordable 
accident frequency 
rate 
1 1 0 0 0 1 N/A 1 0.571 
2 CO2 from energy 
per tonne of 
production (kg) 
1 1 0 1 1 1 N/A 0 0.714 
3 Water per tonne of 
production (m3) 1 1 0 0 0 1 N/A 0 0.429 
4 Total waste per 
tonne of production 1 1 0 0 0 1 N/A 0 0.429 
Quantity of  
Non-Financial KPIs:  4       
Quality of  
Non- Financial KPIs: 0.536 
Overall  
KPIs quantity:  10       
Overall  
KPIs quality:0.527 
Overall is a measure of the quality of financial and nonfinancial KPIs. Disclosure quality is measured as the compliance with the OFR best 
practice guidelines (ASB, 2006). See subsection 3.2 for a detailed description of the measure of the KPI’s disclosure quality. 
